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I. INTRODUCTION
The stock market bubble has burst,' leaving in its wake revelations about
corporate wrongdoing. Among the reactions to corporate failures is the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,2 which seeks to place additional checks on
corporations. Germany is also currently experiencing a recession,' yet has not
faced the major corporate failures that have plagued the United States. As a
result, German commentators have claimed that German corporate law is
superior to U.S. corporate law.4
The functions of corporate governance are threefold: (1) to provide a check
on senior management; (2) to provide a nexus between the corporation and its
shareholders; and (3) to satisfy demands of various constituencies, such as
directors, officers, employees, creditors, and other stakeholders.5 "[Elach
system involved complex trade-offs between the competing virtues of a
governance system: flexibility [versus] stability, innovativeness [versus]
predictable success.'"
It is the goal of this Note to compare the American and German systems of
corporate governance, specifically monitoring mechanisms, to determine
whether the presence of corporate scandals in the United States is the fruit of
American corporate law and whether German law better addresses the
challenge.' This Note concludes that corporate failures are not endemic to the
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Inevitably, When the Bubble Bursts, the Ugly Truth Emerges, WALL ST. J. EUR., Feb. 12, 2002,
at Ml, available at 2002 WL-WSJE 3354525.
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
Tony Major et al., Germany faces double-dip recession, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 13,2002, at PI,
available at 2002 WL 102375612.
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s See generally David Charny, The German Corporate Governance System, 1998 COLUM.
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United States or rooted in Delaware corporations law. This Note further finds
that Germany's reliance on banks seriously undermines a system that looks
promising on paper. The analysis fits into the context of commentators'
current discussions of whether to Americanize German corporate governance.'
Part I provides some historical background and introduces the relativity of
comparative corporate governance. Part I provides a brief introduction to
Delaware corporations law and describes in detail the German corporate law
under the Aktiengesetz. The discussion in Part III focuses on the differences
between the two systems with particular attention given to corporate
monitoring mechanisms. Several key monitoring mechanisms receive
particular attention: (i) separation of ownership from control, (ii) the interplay
of various corporate constituencies, (iii) the market, (iv) the board of
directors/Supervisory Board, and (v) the availability of courts. Part IV
discusses recent U.S. and German corporate failures and the reforms passed to
address them. In Part V, this Note reaches the conclusion that the German
system does not realize its potential as an effective corporate governance
regime and that changes in the German law have failed to adequately address
the problem of bank domination. While Delaware corporate law has also
failed to prevent corporate failures, the combination of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and changes in listing requirements does appear to address previous shortcom-
ings sensibly.
A. Historical Background
The late 1990s and its dot-coin boom saw unprecedented growth. Some
hailed the New Economy as a replacement for traditional economic growth
patterns and rang in a new economic era.9 However, the enthusiasm was not
to last forever. Investors were shaken by the events of September 11, 2001.0
Decisionmaking Under German Law: A Comparative Analysis, 24 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 493,494
(1998).
1 See generally Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modem Corporations: A Comparative
Analysis of German and U.S. Corporate Structures, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 555 (2000)
(stating that some commentators believe that German mechanisms for monitoring and controlling
corporate managers are inferior to those in the United States).
' See generally Charles R.T. O'kelley & Robert B. Thompson, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINEss ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALs (3d ed. 1999) (describing the reasons for why
most corporations chose to incorporate in Delaware).
10 Ane Barnard & Liz Kowalczyk, Reign of Terror Concerted Attacks Hit World Trade
Center and the Pentagon; Thousands are Feared Dead, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 2001, at A 1,
available at 2001 WL 3951060.
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Fear of further attacks and general insecurity led many to pull their money out
of the already battered markets. The result was a great decline in stock prices
and a recession in 2002." In the wake of the stock market collapse, corporate
failures in the form of Enron, 2 WorldCom,"3 Tyco,' Adelphia, 5 inter alia,
surfaced and continued to affect the market by depressing investor confidence.
Political resolve to address the problem of investor confidence grew, and
partially fueled by the upcoming election, the U.S. Congress took action when
it finally passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President George W. Bush
signed it into law on July 30, 2002.6
B. The Relativity, Function & Purpose of Comparative Corporate Governance
Economies are the foundation upon which corporate governance regimes
grow. The United States' peculiar political and ideological fabric led to a
system of corporate governance efficient and uniquely suited for its economic
reality. I Germany's economic landscape is dissimilar from the United States'
context and thus nurtures a system of corporate governance adapted to
" Panel says recession started in March, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 29, 2001, at 2, available at
2001 WL 23646297.
12 See Jonathan Weil, Basic Principle ofAccounting Tripped Enron, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12,
2001, at Cl, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29677610 [hereinafter Weil]; Enron Races to Filefor
Chapter 11, Avoid Liquidation, WALLST. J., Nov. 30,2001, at A3, available at 2001 WL-WSJ
29679314 [hereinafter Enron]; Enron Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, Sues Dynegy, WALLST.
J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A3, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29679572; see also Associated Press,
Andersen Pleads Not Guilty to Obstruction, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Mar. 21,2002, at A10
[hereinafter Andersen]; Kurt Eichenwald, Arthur Andersen Guilty of Obstruction of Justice,
WICHIA EAGLE, June 16, 2002, at 3A [hereinafter Eichenwald].
"3 See Rupert Cornwell, WorldCom pledges to emerge from Chapter I], INDEPENDENT
(London), July 23, 2002, at P17, available at 2002 WL 24042396. [hereinafter Cornwell]
"4 See, e.g., Prosecutor Says Auditors OKd Tyco Transactions, Ci. TRIB., Feb. 8, 2003, at
2, available at 2003 WL 11551275.
11 See Carrie Johnson, Probe ofAdelphia 's Rigas Family Widens; Tax and Mail Fraud also
Suspected, WASH. POST, Aug. 8,2002, at E03 [hereinafter Johnson]. See also Morning Edition:
Tyco Holds Phone Conference Denying Rumors that it is Thinking of Filing for Chapter ))
(NPR Radio Broadcast, July 2002) [hereinafter Morning Edition].
6 Stephen J. Crimmins et al., Sweeping Securities Law Reform Affects Issuers, Officers and
Directors with the Sarbanes-OxleyAct Signed Into Law, the Cost of Being Public Has Just Gone
Up, 169 N.J.L.J. 729 (2002).
"7 See generally Charny, supra note 5.
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different assumptions. 8 That necessarily means that each corporate gover-
nance regime will bring with it its particular features.
Conceptions of multiple equilibria reached by divergent evolu-
tionary pathways ... were shown to have stunning real-world
embodiments in the divergent corporate systems.... [T]he broad
picture of several radically different corporate systems presented
more a set of ideal types than a complete description of the
corporate world. Each system spawned deviant cases and
evolutionary "mutations," which thrived in their peculiar
economic niches. Further, each system involved complex trade-
offs between the competing virtues of a governance system:
flexibility vs. stability, innovativeness vs. predictable success.'9
In the course of their evolution, the German and U.S. corporate systems thus
necessarily developed different solutions to similar basic corporate functions:
(i) corporate governance provides a check on senior management, reducing the
likelihood of opportunistic behavior and ensuring that management acts in the
best interest of the enterprise; (ii) corporate governance provides a nexus
between the corporation and its stakeholders; and (iii) corporate governance
serves political functions between the corporate officers, employees, directors,
and any other stakeholders.' While the topic of this Note is primarily the first
function, it will incidentally and necessarily address the latter two as well.
"S See generally id One should not be surprised by the assertion that the German system of
corporate governance with respect to the German economic landscape is as efficient as the U.S.
corporate governance system with respect to its own origins. See generally MARK J. ROE,
STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE PoLrrICALRooTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE
(1994). An absolute view of relativism, however, may render this Note moot. How can one
compare two systems' attempts to address a particular problem, if the two systems are not
comparable, because they spring from a different economic/cultural denominator? The answer
is either that there must be some limit to relativism or that the concept of cultural relativism does
not reach the issue here. Certain foundational assumptions of U.S. and German corporate
governance systems are constant. Both regimes provide solutions to the problem this Note seeks
to address-opportunism of corporate officers. The answers that German law and U.S. law
provide differ. Therefore, the critical reader should ask whether the answers given are locality
specific or whether they could as well serve to answer the other jurisdiction's questions.
'" See Charny, supra note 5, at 145-46.
20 Id. at 146-47.
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If. BACKGROUND
A. The U.S. Corporation-Structure and Governance
The individual states that comprise the United States have many corporate
governance schemes. Since corporations law is state law, each of the fifty
states and the U.S. territories has developed different answers to the problems
of corporations. Out of the existing systems, two particularly are worth noting:
(i) the Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA)21 and (ii) the Delaware
General Corporations Law. Many states have based their corporate codes on
the former, while the latter is the most important and influential corporations
code in the United States, as the great majority of large American corporations
are incorporated under Delaware law.22 For that reason, this Note will focus
exclusively on Delaware corporate law.
1. The Shareholders
The shareholders in a Delaware corporation are its residual owners. Most
significantly, the shareholders elect the board of directors.23 The general
avenue for shareholder action is the annual meeting,' although extraordinary
meetings may be called by the directors or by anyone authorized by the
certificate of incorporation or the bylaws.' Certain actions by the directors
require shareholder approval by simple or supermajority-these are generally
defined by the corporation's certificate of incorporation or its bylaws,26 the
shareholders have the power to remove any director, or the entire board, with
or without cause by a majority vote unless the certificate of incorporation
provides otherwise.27 Alternatively, the board of directors may serve staggered
terms. In the case of cumulative voting, a director may be removed if
sufficient votes to elect a director are cast in favor of removal.'
21 It should be noted that the MBCA was revised in 1984 and has been amended several
times since. The revised version is referred to as the RMBCA.
' See generally O'KEI.EY & THOMPSON, supra note 9.
23 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 141 (2002).
24 Id. §211.
Id. § 211(d).
26 Id § 102(b)(4), § 109(b).
27 Id. § 211.
28 Id. § 141(k).
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2. The Directors
The directors of the Delaware corporation are entrusted with the manage-
ment of the corporation.29 They meet several times a year, establish the basic
policies of the corporation, hire the corporation's officers, and delegate to
them the day-to-day operations of the company."
3. The Officers
The officers are charged with the day-to-day management of the corpora-
tion. In this context, they have authority to make decisions for the corporation.
In cases involving the long-term plans and policies of the corporation,
however, such as mergers and acquisitions, only directors have authority to
make decisions.3'
4. Summary
Overall, the Delaware corporation is a highly flexible vehicle to organize
a business. While the basic structure is statutorily described, the Delaware
General Corporation Law leaves much room for corporate self-determination.32
Undoubtedly, such wide latitude gives corporations much play in making
decisions-the fact that the majority of U.S. corporations are incorporated in
Delaware is evidence of Delaware's flexible system. German corporate
governance is more circumscribed.
B. German Corporate Governance-Structure
The German corporate form is the Aktiengesellschaft (AG), which
translates literally into Share- or Stocksociety. The relevant law can largely
29 Id. § 141.
3" Id. § 142(b).
31 Id.
32 Id § 142(b) (allowing the term and selection of officers to be set in the corporation's
bylaws or certificate of incorporation); id. § 141 (a) (granting the board of directors the power
to manage the corporation except as may be otherwise provided in the certificate of incorpora-
tion); id. § 141(b) (permitting the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws to determine the
qualifications of directors); id. § 141(c) (allowing the board of directors to form committees as
it sees fit).
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be found in the Aktiengesetz von 1965 (Sharelaw of 1965)." The basic code
is augmented by several other provisions, which this Note will introduce as
they become relevant.34
The AG is composed of and organized around three different entities. 5
These are (i) the Hauptversammlung36 (stockholder meeting), (ii) the
Aufsichtsrat" (Supervisory Board), and (iii) the Vorstand38 (Management
Board).3 9 The following sections address each of these entities separately.
1. The Stockholder Meeting
The functions, rights, and duties of the stockholder meeting are provided
by sections 118 through 146 of the Sharelaw of 1965: "The shareholders
exercise their rights with respect to corporate matters in the stockholder
meeting unless otherwise provided by law."' The stockholder meeting is the
vehicle through which the shareholders exercise their power. Stockholders
guide the fundamental policies of the AG, but the stockholder meeting is not
permitted to interfere with the everyday affairs of the corporation."' The
quotidian management of the enterprise is the domain of the Management
Board.42 The rights of the shareholders are enumerated in section 119 of the
Sharelaw as follows:
11 §§ 1-410 AktG. For a discussion of the reasons for the replacement of the previous
corporations law by the 1965 code, see generally Butler, supra note 8.
' It should be noted that many questions left unanswered by the Aktiengesetz are governed
by the laws generally applicable to associations. For example, the Commercial Code of 1897
(Handelsgesetzbuch-HGB) provides regulations regarding commercial records and accounting
requirements and § 31 of the Civil Code (Buergerliches Gesetz Buch-BGB) provides that AGs
are vicariously liable for wrongful acts of their directors and other senior members of
management. See Assmann et al., The Law of Business Associations, in INTRODUCrlON TO
GERMAN LAw 137 (Wemer F. Ebke & Matthew W. Funkin eds., 1996).
15 §§ 76,95,118 AktG.
36 § 118 AktG.
37 § 95 AktG.
33 § 76 AktG.
3' See Charny, supra note 5, at 158.
' § 118 AktG. Translations from the Aktiengesetz are the author's own. To indicate the use
of translated code, the translated sentences have been placed in quotation marks.
41 ENNO W. ERCIcLENrz, JR., MODERN GERMAN CORPoRAT1ON LAw 93 (1979).
42 § 119 AktG.
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Rights of the Stockholder Meeting. (1) The Stockholder Meeting
decides all matters expressly provided by law and in the articles
of corporation (Satzung), as enumerated:
1. the appointment of members of the Supervisory Board,
unless such members are required to be delegated to the
Supervisory Board, or unless such members are dele-
gated by the employees pursuant to the codetermination
laws;
2. the use of retained earnings;
3. the [annual] release from responsibility of the Manage-
ment Board and the Supervisory Board;
4. the [annual] appointment of an auditor;
5. amendments to the articles of incorporation;
6. measures relating to acquisition and reduction of capital;
7. appointment of auditors for the examination of the
events surrounding the formation or transactions of
management;
8. the dissolution of the AG.
(2) Questions of management may only be decided if the
management so requests. 3
The most notable of the powers of the stockholder meeting are the power
to appoint members of the Supervisory Board and to decide what use is to be
made of retained earnings." This leaves the stockholder meeting with the
power to declare dividends-a power not held by the other organs of the AG.'5
A shareholder faces liability for damages if he intentionally and through his
influence upon the company induces a member of the Management Board or
the Supervisory Board to act to the detriment of the company or its sharehold-
ers.
46
'3 § 119 AktG.
" § 119 AktG(l)(2).
43 ERCKLENTz, supra note 41, at 93.
46 Assmann et al., supra note 34, at 147.
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2. The Supervisory Board
a. Structure
The Supervisory Board's primary duty is oversight of the Management
Board appointed by it as the latter operates the AG.'7 This is a marked
difference from the board of directors under Delaware law, which holds policy
and management powers and is responsible to the stockholders for the
management of the corporation." Note also that the shareholder meeting and
not the Supervisory Board has the power to declare dividends under German
law, while in the Delaware corporation, directors have the authority to declare
dividends.
The composition of the Supervisory Board is complex, but warrants careful
explanation for it is a crucial feature in the AG's system of checks and
balances. Several Mitbestimmungsgesetze (codetermination laws) mandate
certain compositions of the Supervisory Board.'9 Codetermination laws
regulate the involvement of a firm's employees in the corporate decision-
making process.' These laws provide employees or union groups with seats
on the Supervisory Board of certain AGsO' This Note will discuss the
codetermination laws and their effects separately in the next sections. 2 While
there are four codetermination laws on the books, five possible configurations
of the size and composition of a Supervisory Board exist. Four stem from the
four codetermination laws themselves, while the fifth results from the rare
situation in which none of the codetermination laws applies.53
Generally, the Sharelaw prescribes that the Supervisory Board shall consist
of (i) three members or any multiple of three and (ii) that any board larger than
three does not exceed specified limits related to the stated capital of the AG.'
There are two exceptions to this rule: the board may be larger if the articles of
ERCirZ supra note 41, at 94.
"See Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 141 (2002).
See Charny, supra note 5, at 158-59.
5 Butler, supra note 8, at 561.
5' ERCKLENTZ supra note 41, at 96.
52 This Note will not discuss the mechanics of the codetermination laws; they are
complicated and technical issues of labor law not relevant to the thesis of this Note.
51 ERCKLENTZ, supra note 41. at 97.
1' § 95 AktG; § 7(1) Gesetz ueber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer vom 4. Mai 1976
(BGB1 I S. 1153) (referred to as 1976 codetermination law).
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incorporation provide for a larger board," or, if any codetermination law other
than the 1952 law56 applies, the size and composition is governed by special
provisions of the particular codetermination law.57 The maximum number of
Board members and the permissible number in substantially all publicly traded
corporations is twenty-one.58 If provided in the memorandum of association
(the equivalent of the certificate of incorporation), some members of the
Supervisory Board may be appointed by certain shareholders.59
b. The 1951 Codetennination Law
This law provides for a certain minimum number of members for the
Supervisory Board of a covered AG.' The law applies to (i) businesses in the
coal and iron industries that (ii) regularly employ more than 1000 workers.6
Under the 1951 law, the board of directors will consist of eleven members,
unless the articles of incorporation provide for a larger number. Of the eleven,
five are representatives of the stockholders,62 five are representatives of the
employees, and the remaining board member is elected by the stockholders
upon motion by the already acting members of the board.63 If the board is
larger than eleven members, the ratio of representation provided for in the law
will remain constant.
c. The 1952 Codetermination Law
Generally, the 1952 Codetermination Law applies to AGs with up to 2000
employees unless the AG is engaged in the coal, steel, or iron industry. If this
law is applicable, at least one-third of the Supervisory Board must be
55 § 95 AktG.
5 See infra note 64.
-" § 95 AktG. See Chamy, supra note 5.
58 § 95 AktG.
51 § 103 III AktG; Assmann et al., supra note 34, at 148.
1 ERCKLENrL, supra note 41, at 99.
"' § 4 Gesetz ueber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitsnelunenr in den Aufsichtsraeten und
Vorstaenden der Untemehmen des Bergbaus under Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden Insustrie vom
21. Mai 1951 (BGB1. I S. 347), as amended by Gesetz vom 6. September 1965 (BGB1. I. S.
347) [hereinafter 1951 Codetermination Law].
2 In the case of the German iron, steel, and coal industries, the government, be it local or
federal, traditionally holds a significant stake in the companies.
I § 4 1951 Codetermination Law.
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comprised of representatives of the employees.Y In contrast to the other
codetermination laws, the 1952 law does not impose any size requirements on
the board.65 It follows that under this law, the size of the board will be
prescribed by the Sharelaw. There are a number of exceptions to the rule, most
notably that in the case where (i) one single individual owns all stock, or that
all stockholders are related within the meaning of the tax law and (ii) the AG
has less than 500 employees, the AG will not be subject to the law.
d. The Supplementary Codetermination Law
This law applies to holding companies in the coal, iron, and steel
industries.' It thus applies to companies that dominate an enterprise in which
the employees have the right to elect members of the board pursuant to the
1951 Codetermination Law. If the Supplementary Codetermination Law
applies, it specifies a fifteen-member board.67 Of these, seven members will
be representatives of the stockholders, seven will be representatives of the
employees, and the tie-breaking fifteenth member of the board will be elected
on the motion of the members of the board already serving.' In certain
instances, the law permits more than fifteen board members, but in such a case,
the prescribed ratios may not change. Furthermore, the board's employee
representation shall consist partly of employees proper and partly of union
representation.
e. The 1976 Codetermination Law
The 1976 Codetermination Law provides similar parity provisions between
stockholder and employee representatives as provided in the preceding laws.69
The law applies to any corporation employing more than 2000 workers and not
ERCKIENT", supra note 41, at 100.
I5 id. at 99.
§ 5 Gesetz zur Ergaenzung des Gesetzes ueber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in
den Aufsichtsraeten und Vorstaenden der Unternehemen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl
erzeugenden Industrie vom 7. August 1956 (BGB1. I S. 707), as amended by Gesetz vom 27.
April 1967 (BGBI. I S. 505) [hereinafter Supplementary Codetermination Law].
67 Id.
68I
I § 7(1), Gesetz ueber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer vom 4. Mai 1976 (BGBI. I
S. 1153) [hereinafter 1976 Codetermination Law].
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already covered by one of the preceding laws.7" If the 1976 Codetermination
Law applies, the size and composition of the board is not determined by the
capital invested, as generally is the case in the codetermination laws discussed
above, but by the number of persons regularly employed. 7' The size of the
board increases with the number of workers regularly employed 72 and will be
divided equally between representatives of the employees and the sharehold-
ers.
7 3
There are certain limitations and qualifications for membership on the
Supervisory Board. A member of the board must be free of legal disabilities.74
No individual is permitted to sit on more than ten Supervisory Boards. 5 The
most important qualification, though, is that a member of the Supervisory
Board may not also be a member of the Management Board of the same AG.76
Since it is the statutory duty of the [Supervisory Board] to
appoint the management board and to monitor its activities,
simultaneous service on both corporate organs is deemed to be
incompatible and is thus prohibited in principle. This strict line
between [the Supervisory Board] and management board creates
the so-called "two-tier" management system of the stock corpora-
tion law. The difference between this practice and the tradition
in Delaware and in the United States generally, where members
of the executive staff are also frequently members of the board of
directors, is thus apparent.'
Furthermore, members of the Management Board of dependent enterprises
likewise are disqualified for membership on the Supervisory Board of the
parent.78
0 Id.
71 Id.
I It is worth noting that German labor law, compared to U.S. labor law, makes laying off
workers more difficult. Large fluctuations of workforce, common in U.S. recessions, are
therefore'not widespread in Germany. Should certain events nonetheless necessitate a change
in the composition of the board, or otherwise cast into doubt the composition of the board, the
law provides mechanisms for correction. §§ 97-98 AktG.
" § 7(1), 1976 Codetermination Law.
74 § 100(l)AktG.
- § 100(2) AktG.
76 § 105 AktG.
I ERCKLErz, supra note 41, at I11.
78 § 100(2) AktG.
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Should it become necessary to remove members of the Supervisory Board,
the removal can be effectuated by a supermajority of three-quarters of the
stockholder votes cast: 9 in effect the group or person who elected the member
will have the right to remove that member." Alternatively, there is a provision
allowing removal by the court for "material cause."'" The court has authority
to remove any member of the board regardless of who elected him.82 The
board itself, by a simple majority vote, can also institute removal proceedings;
"This particular provision was intended as an escape hatch in cases where the
body of person electing the member either cannot or will not act, [and a
particular member of the board has created conditions making his continued
membership on the board intolerable]." 3
f Rights, Duties, and Liabilities of the Supervisory Board
The Supervisory Board appoints the Management Board of the AG. 4
Thereafter the board's principal duty becomes the broad oversight of the
Management Board; 'This function is [the Supervisory Board's] main 'raison
d'etre' and it derives its German designation therefrom."" Supervision
extends to all actions of the Management Board including their "legality and
commercial soundness."" Yet, the Supervisory Board has no direct power to
manage the affairs of the corporation. 'The overseeing function of the
[Supervisory] Board should thus not be confused with a right to interfere with
the activities of the Management Board. The influence of the [Supervisory
Board] upon such activities is thus necessarily indirect, in that it is based solely
on its power to remove the Management Board." 7
The articles of incorporation may contain provisions that require the
approval of the Supervisory Board for certain types of transactions, 8 but even
in the absence of express provisions, the Supervisory Board may assert this
- § 103(l) AktG.
90 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 ERCKLENTZ, supra note 41, at 114.
" § 84 AktG.
85 ERCKLENTZ, supra note 41, at 147.
86 Assmann et al., supra note 34, at 148.
s ERCKLENrz, supra note 41, at 147-48.
88 The author is not aware of how many corporations actually have such provisions in the
articles.
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power sua sponte and demand review by specifying the types of transactions
to be subject to its approval after adopting a resolution to that effect. 9 Should
the Management Board fail to heed the demands of the Supervisory Board, it
subjects itself to liability to the AG for resulting damages. The Management
Board may appeal the Supervisory Board's refusal of approval of a given
transaction to the shareholders, who then can override the veto with seventy-
five percent of the votes cast at the meeting.'
The Supervisory Board will receive reports on the state of the AG. Beyond
the simple receipt and review of those reports, the Supervisory Board must
make an active effort to keep fully abreast of the financial stature of the AG.
This necessitates frequent contact between the Management and Supervisory
Boards.
The Supervisory Board has potential liabilities "to the AG and, under some
circumstances, to creditors of the AG for any loss or damage suffered by the
AG."' .The same standards of care apply to the Supervisory Board and the
Management Board.' The members of the respective boards are required to
act with the care of a normally conscientious member. The specific bases for
liability are enumerated in section 93(3) of the Sharelaw.93
Beyond the general standard of care, there is a duty to act affirmatively on
behalf of the corporation. If one member of the Supervisory Board has
information with regard to the problems enumerated in the liability provision,
it will be the duty of the Supervisory Board member to share that information
with the board and to take all reasonable steps to cause the Supervisory Board
to act on the matter. Members of the board are absolved of liability if loss or
89 § 111(4) AktG. Transactions that commonly require approval by the Supervisory Board
are investments of assets abroad, the acquisition or sale of real property in excess of a specified
value, the issuance of guarantees, or the execution of employment agreements calling for
compensation in excess of a specified sum. See ERCK.ENTZ, supra note 41, at 148. This
resolution demand procedure may also be used to request information from the Management
Board at any time and the Management Board will be required to respond. § 90 AktG. There
is also a collective right of the Supervisory Board to inspect books, records, and assets of the
AG.
90 § 1l1(4) AktG.
" ERCKILENTz, supra note 41, at 161.
92 §§93, ll6 AktG.
9 These include, for example, the unlawful payments of dividends, the unlawful
reimbursement of capital contributions of shareholders, the unlawful distribution of the assets
of the AG, the unlawful grant of credit, and the unlawful payment of compensation to members
of the Supervisory Board. See ERCKIENTZ, supra note 41, at 162.
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damage arises from a lawful resolution of the meeting of stockholders.'
Liability against the Supervisory Board can be asserted only by the AG, and
not by stockholders or by third parties, except creditors, who may assert
liability against the board if the AG is unable to satisfy its debts.9"
3. The Management Board
The branch of the AG that remains to be introduced is the Management
Board. It is the body that directs the day-to-day affairs of the corporation and
has the statutory duty to manage the AG." The members of the Management
Board are appointed by the Supervisory Board.97 The Management Board is
not subject to instructions or demands from the general meeting of sharehold-
ers--the shareholders must therefore bring any such concerns or demands via
the Supervisory Board."
The main difference between the AG and the Delaware corporation is that
the Management Board of the AG bears the ultimate responsibility for the
management of the corporation, while that duty in Delaware is borne by the
board of directors--the executives act only as agents of the corporation.99 The
Aktiengesetz creates coequal and non-hierarchical Management Board
members, but the board is permitted to designate a chairperson, although such
chairperson will not have additional powers. " The Management Board is not
coequal with the Supervisory Board and enjoys the latter's deference.1"' Also,
the members of the Management Board are not permitted to serve on the
Supervisory Board of the same corporation. "This disqualification is based on
the view that simultaneous service on both bodies would involve the dual
member in conflicting duties and is thus incompatible."'0 2
The Management Board is charged to take into account four different
interests while carrying out its executive functions: the AG, its stockholders,
§ 93(4) AktG.
9' § 93(5) AktG.
9 §76(1) AktG.
9' Assmann et al., supra note 34, at 148. The coequality of Management Board members
does not appear to exist in practical reality.
9s Assmann et al., supra note 34, at 149.
99 See Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, 99 141-42 (2002).
"® § 84(2) AktG.
101 See Charny, supra note 5, at 147.
102 ERCKLENTz, supra note 41, at 118.
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the welfare of the employees, and the community at large. 3 These interests
are to be served equally; thus the "profit motive for the benefit of stockholders
is not deemed to be the paramount principle governing the obligations of the
Management Board."'" The powers of the Management Board may be limited
by the memorandum of association, the Supervisory Board, and by certain
resolutions of the general meeting. 0 5 Most importantly, certain types of
transactions and decisions, as determined by the Supervisory Board or
memorandum, may only be undertaken with express consent of the Supervi-
sory Board.' 6
When managing the corporation, the members of the Management Board
have the duty to act as diligent and prudent managers, and are jointly and
severally liable to the Supervisory Board for failure to fulfill these duties. 7
Members of the Management Board are not liable to the corporation if a
transaction is grounded in express shareholder approval.'0 8 Liability is not
precluded, however, if the Supervisory Board approved the transaction."° The
AG may waive the Management Board's liability three years from the date that
such liability arose, with approval of the shareholders. °"0 Each year the
stockholders meeting has the duty to sign off on the actions of the Management
Board and the Supervisory Board and release them from responsibility."' The
release constitutes a deliberated and thoughtful approval of the actions of the
boards, the decision being made on the financial statements, the business
report, and the report of the Supervisory Board." 2 Release of the boards from
responsibility does not represent a waiver of claims for damages." 3
'03 See Bernard Grossfeld & Werner Ebke, Controlling the Modem Corporation, 26 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 397, 431 (1978) (discussing Rathenau's "corporate good citizen concept").
"o ERCKLENTz, supra note 41, at 198 (stating also that the trifold management objectives are
well in line with Germany's "social" market economy).
'0 Assmann et al., supra note 34, at 149.
106 § lI(IV) AktG.
"07 See Assmann et al., supra note 34, at 149. But cf ERCKIENTZ, supra note 41, at 209
(describing the Management Board's duty as that of the "ordinary and conscientious manager").
108 § 93(4) AktG.
109 U
110 Id.
II § 120(1) AktG.
1 §§ 120(2)-(3) AktG.
"§ 120(2) AktG.
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EI. DIFFERENCES IN MONITORING OF MANAGEMENT BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
The differences between the German corporate system and the U.S. system
can be said to stem from the German reliance on banks as a primary source of
funding"' while the United States relies on private investment. German
corporations do not depend as much on exchange-listed securities, but rather
on direct loans from banks."' This fundamental premise dominates the
discussion below. To facilitate a structured analysis, the different monitoring
organs are treated in separate categories; however, there is a fair amount of
overlap between the categories.
A. Separation of Ownership from Control: Tensions between Owners and
Management and the Influence of German Banks
1. The Influence of Banks
German banks are extensively involved in German corporations; they own
large blocks of shares, actively vote those shares at meetings, and influence the
membership of the Supervisory Board."' As such, banks are powerful
stakeholders and monitors of management. In this way, ownership and control
are intertwined in Germany.
In the United States, stock ownership and control are separated." 7 Early in
the twentieth century, this separation allowed U.S. corporations to raise large
amounts of capital from a diverse pool of small investors."' Nevertheless,
U.S. banks have little influence over U.S. corporations. Several laws limit the
ability of financial institutions to hold controlling blocks of stock, furthering
separation of control and ownership." 9 The Glass-Steagall Act, for example,
14 See MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA: THE CAUSES AND CURES OF OUR
BusNEss MYOPIA 69-71 (1991).
I John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1302 (1991).
116 See Charny, supra note 5, at 151-52.
1" Adolph A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 4-7 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1967) (1932) (stating that American corporations
are often described as Berle-Means Corporations).
1' Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United
States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993).
9 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in
the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1 (2001).
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separates commercial from investment banks and prohibits commercial banks
from owning and dealing in securities."12 Secondly, the Bank Holding
Company Act, limits banks' activities further and prohibits even "bank
affiliates" from holding more than five percent of a company's voting stock.'21
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) further discourages
large block share ownership. 122
There are no comparable laws that limit German banks in this manner. 23
As a result, banks have significant holdings in and control over German
corporations," reducing the importance of individual investors and allowing
German banks to assert large influence over German corporations. 12  in
contrast, pension funds, investment funds, and insurance companies, the most
important investors in the United States, have little influence in Germany. 126
German banks are permitted by law to offer a complete palette of commercial
banking and investment services.2 7 Furthermore, individuals holding shares
" Glass-Stegall Act, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24)
(preventing banks from underwriting, distributing, selling, or dealing in investment securities,
except on their own account; barring banks from affiliating with any company engaged
principally in underwriting securities; making it unlawful for investment banks to accept
deposits; prohibiting any officer or director of a commercial bank from managing a company
primarily engaged in the securities business).
2 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6)-(7) (1988).
'u Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 10041-11461) (prescribing highly diversified pension fund holdings).
11 See Kreditwesengesetz, BgBl. 1472 (1985 1) (regulating commencement and conduct of
banking operations, but containing only general safety and soundness provisions for banks'
ownership of non-banking companies). For an English translation of the law, see HANNEs
SCHNEIDER Er AL, THE GERMAN BANKING SYSTEM (4th ed. 1987).
24 Theodor Baums, Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks, 40 AM. J.
COMP. L. 503, 506 (1992); see also Jeffery N. Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, German Corporate
Governance, and the Transition Costs of Capitalism, 1998 CoLm. Bus. L. REV. 185, 192
(1998) ("From an American perspective, the distinctive feature of German corporate governance
is the role of the leading German banks, which have representatives on supervisory boards of
most large publicly traded German firms, often as Chair."); see Singhof & Seiler, supra note 7.
11 See Butler, supra note 8, at 560; see also Hwa-Jin Kim, Markets, Financial Institutions,
and Corporate Governance: Perspectives from Germany, 26 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 371, 373
(1995).
126 See Kim, supra note 125, at 374.
127 See Butler, supra note 8, at 560 (stating that the "universal" service offered by banks even
reaches into the insurance business and mergers and acquisitions consulting); see also Janis
Sarra, Corporate Governance in Global Capital Markets, Canadian and International
Developments, 76 TuL L. REv. 1691, 1716 (2002) (stating that lack of laws constraining banks
made the role of the bank as intermediary between investors and the corporation key to
governance structures).
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often permit banks to vote the shares on their behalf.2 ' Recently, the
importance of banks has been increasing as the separation between banking
and insurance industries has been disintegrating-for example, Deutsche Bank
now holds ten percent of Allianz and Mtinchener Rfickversicherung, Ger-
many's two largest insurers.'29 When compared to the U.S., the German
system relies on the precautionary attitude of banks, and not the threat of
individual shareholder liquidity, as a check on management. 3
The influence of German banks arguably leads to a group of passive
minority investors that, because of their relatively small stakes and wide
dispersal, lack the ability, information, and incentives to actively monitor their
corporations.' When investors are relatively passive, managers have more
room for independent decision-making.'32 German shareholdings are
comparatively more concentrated-it is common for banks to own a combined
share of twenty percent.'33 Because of the large number of shares held by
German banks, they are not as readily saleable as they would be in the U.S.
market-the size of the block and lack of market are the primary obstacles.'
In other words, the well-developed market for corporate debt in the United
States is a factor in the comparatively small influence of banks on U.S.
corporations. In U.S. companies, concentrations of bank holdings totaling
more than five percent are considered large. 3
2. Shareholder Voting
In order for shareholders to be effective monitors, it is necessary for them
to communicate with each other. In U.S. corporations, shareholders directly
are the supreme constituency 36 and have various means at their disposal that
128 Baums, supra note 124, at 506.
129 Kim supra note 125, at 374-75.
3 Baums, supra note 124, at 506.
131 See Robert E. Benfield, Note, Curing American Managerial Myopia: Can the German
System of Corporate Governance Help? 17 LOY. LA. INT'L& COMP. L.J. 615 (1995); see also
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A
Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REv. 73, 88-
89, 105 (1995).
132 Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between
Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 876 (1993).
133 See Roe, supra note 118.
'u Coffee, supra note 115, at 1304.
3 Id at 1294-95.
136 Mark J. Loewenstein, What Can We Learn from Foreign Systems?: Stakeholder
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are designed as checks on the board of directors. Perhaps the most important
check is the power to vote. To make voting rights fully effective, shareholders
also have inspection rights, preemptive rights, and cumulative voting
provisions. 37 Voting rights exist in a number of situations: (i) election and
removal of directors; (ii) situations of significant corporate change, such as
mergers and liquidations; (iii) and approval and repeal of bylaws. In some
jurisdictions, shareholders have the power to remove management and bring
the corporation under shareholder control. 3
To allow for rapid deployment of the shareholders' power, special meetings
may be called. Although attendance at shareholder meetings is generally
poor,'39 U.S. corporations allow for voting by proxy. U.S. Securities &
Exchange Commission (SEC) proxy regulations regulate and, in effect, limit
the ability of U.S. shareholders to freely communicate with each other. " This
prevents shareholders from exerting control through concerted action. SEC
proxy regulations require the corporation to make complete and correct
disclosure. A private right to action exists for the violation of disclosure rules,
yet the cause of action has recently been narrowed. While the SEC has
attempted to revise the proxy regulations to allow shareholders more input in
the management of the corporation, the effect of the regulations has been
doubtful. 4 '
Whereas SEC regulations hamper communications among U.S. sharehold-
ers, the concentration of shares in Germany and less stringent proxy rules make
communication less costly. 2 Historically, proxy voting by banks has been an
important feature of the German corporate law." 3 Since early experience
showed that shareholders scarcely attended stockholder meetings, representa-
tion of shareholders by banks was thought to be a viable alternative in
personam attendance of shareholders.'" Many small German investors prefer
to have voting decisions made by professionals at their banks. 45 It should be
Protection in Germany and Japan, 76 TUL L. REv. 1673, 1674 (2002).
'"See RMCBA §§ 6.30, 7.28.
'~s See i d § 7.32.
"3 See Butler, supra note 8, at 595.
't See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15
CARDOZo L. REv. 837 (1994).
141 Id.
142 Baums, supra note 124, at 505.
143 Butler, supra note 8, at 557.
'Id.
14 Kim, supra note 125, at 378 (suggesting that transfer of voting rights is relatively easy and
may be done by buried clauses in deposit contracts).
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noted that German banks tend to vote deferentially to the wishes of manage-
ment; nonetheless, the ability to wield the full power of their large block of
shares remains" 6 and makes it possible to elect employees of the bank to the
Supervisory Board."'7 Banks occasionally exercise this right and place
representatives onto the Supervisory Board when needed. 48 As such, banks
are actively involved in corporate governance to protect their investments,
improve their position as creditors, and to capture all or at least part of a
corporation's financial business."' 9 Deutsche Bank, for example, supplies
Supervisory Board members to 400 corporations."0 Herein lies another
significant difference from the U.S. system, in that a large German bank,
unilaterally and without input or resistance by management, is able to supply
directors. Such directors, because they are beholden to the bank instead of to
incumbent management, are in theory more impartial than U.S. board members
are when evaluating management decisions.' Of course, one risks trading
dependence to the CEO or board with dependence to the banks.
In German, as compared to U.S., corporations, the voice of minority
shareholders is muffled because of bank and labor presence. Nonetheless,
some powers remain. Most tangibly, if the Supervisory Board shareholder
contingent votes as an undivided block it will maintain a majority of labor
representation. 52 However, since bank representatives are members of the
shareholder contingent, minority shareholders will depend on banks to pass
their agenda.
B. The Interplay of Corporate Constituencies as Monitoring Device: Tensions
between Owners, Lenders, and Labor
Tensions between corporate constituencies create security at the cost of
flexibility and reduced rapidity of decision-making. Differences in interests
and degrees of risk acceptance create conflicts and, given an appropriate
corporate governance structure, will force dialogue and compromise between
the different constituencies. In the case of a proposed merger, for example,
well-represented labor constituencies can have a tremendous influence on the
'" See Roe, supra note 118, at 1927.
'7 See Bauns, supra note 124, at 505-07.
148 Id.
14" Kim, supra note 125, at 375.
s Baurms, supra note 124, at 505.
5' Benfield, supra note 131, at 631.
152 Loewenstein, supra note 136, at 1677-78.
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transaction. While labor representation adds another watchful eye replete with
its own set of preferences and demands, it comes at the expense of
efficiency.53
The U.S. corporation has two major corporate constituencies: shareholders
and lenders."5 4 U.S. corporations use both equity securities (those conferring
a slice of ownership) and debt securities (secured bonds and unsecured
debentures) to raise capital. Holders of debt securities are not "owners" of a
corporation, but rather lenders.'5" The coexistence of lenders and owners
necessarily creates tension since both constituencies have different attitudes
towards risks. 56 Generally, creditors are more risk averse than are sharehold-
ers. 7 U.S. creditors enjoy protection in the form of a liquidation preference.
Since banks are not major U.S. equity shareholders, institutional investors
are the next largest and most important equity based constituency as they
usually hold significant blocks of shares. Nevertheless, their influence on
corporate governance is limited. 5 Several legal schemes intended to require
diversified mutual and pension funds effectively limit the influence of
institutional investors.
German creditors are not as well protected as their U.S. counterparts. Their
claims are valuable only if "the corporation has received all amounts it claims
to have paid in for its [par value] equity securities, and if the corporation is not
able to distribute the assets needed to satisfy the creditor to the equity security
holders."'59 In essence, there exists a liquidation preference, at par value, to
the equity shareholders. The board representation of German banks gives
creditors the level of protection that the legal system fails to provide. On the
Supervisory Board, banks not only have access to corporate information, but,
more importantly, have the ability to influence corporate decision-making.
"I The struggle of UAL management to reduce labor cost prior to filing for Chapter 11
bankruptcy provides an example of the inefficiencies that can be added by labor representation.
See, e.g., Marilyn Adams, UAL cites improvements in its financial situation, USA TODAY, May
5, 2003, at 2B.
" In the wake of corporate accountability scandals one might predict a move in state
assemblies to propose corporate constituent statutes that would require corporations to take into
account the interests of constituencies beyond shareholders and creditors.
155 See Butler, supra note 8, at 580.
156 id
157 See Charny, supra note 5.
's See Butler, supra note 8, at 585.
's9 Id. at 581.
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Another watchful constituency in the German corporation is the labor
representation'6° on the Supervisory Board as provided by the applicable
codetermination law. As mentioned previously, codetermination laws give
employees seats on the Supervisory Boards of German AGs. Furthermore,
works councils of employees do consider strategic issues and German law
requires consultation on specific matters. 1 ' Employees therefore take part
directly in corporate governance and are well informed about the state of
corporate affairs. Labor would presumably be risk averse with respect to all
issues influencing job security, pay, and benefits.16 2
On balance, Germany's mix of constituencies has the potential to create an
environment in which management misbehavior is more likely to be detected
than under U.S. law. The combination of labor as a viable corporate
constituency and the relatively more influential lender constituency does not
exist to the same degree in the United States. While providing additional
security, the German system, however, should be expected to be less efficient
and flexible than Delaware law.
C. External Controls on Management by the Market
Structural rules governing the allocation of decision-making power between
the directors, managers, and shareholders cannot be considered outside of the
market context. 63 While U.S. shareholders have limited power to influence
corporate governance directly, their most efficient avenue to express discontent
with incumbent management is to sell their shares. Shareholders are expected
to watch the market carefully and react to factors affecting the worth of the
company whose shares they are holding. "Active trading on a well-informed
market gives up-to-the-minute assessments of how managers are performing,
while the market for control ideally might provide for quick and ruthless
1"0 See Brett H. McDonnell, The Curious Incident of the Workers in the Boardroom, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 503 (2000); Sanford M. Jacoby, Employee Representation and Corporate
Governance: A Missing Link, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 449 (2001).
16 Wendy Carlin & David Soskice, Shocks to the System: The German Political Economy
Under Stress, 159 NAT'L INST. ECON. REV. 57, 65 (1997); Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck,
Workplace Representation Overseas: The Works Councils Story, in Working Under Different
Rules 97; 99 (Richard B. Freeman ed., 1994).
' See Charny, supra note 5, at 159.
6 See Butler, supra note 8, at 587.
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replacement of managers who are performing badly."'" The market, thus, is
one of the most potent checks on U.S. management.
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, all information about a
firm's future income potential immediately affects its stock price. 5 Under
good management, share value will be high; under poor management, share
value will be low." To facilitate efficient markets, SEC regulations are based
on a regime of full disclosure.
16
With low share values, poorly managed firms are vulnerable to takeovers
and replacement of management. This should theoretically lead to the ouster
of inefficient incumbent management. Therefore, incumbent management will
have an incentive to maintain the short-term value of stock-keeping it high
to indicate management efficiency. 68 Tender offers, however, are not equally
likely at all times of the economic cycle, occurring mainly during times of
growth. Therefore, even efficient markets may at times be less than optimal
tools for monitoring."6 9
The German market is not as well developed as the U.S. market.70 First,
of the 2,373 corporations in Germany, only 503 are exchange-listed and the
number of listed companies is slow to increase.' Many of the listed
corporations are largely family-owned and have little public float. 2 This
limited market creates a lack of liquidity, perpetuates the banks' need to
exercise their votes,'73 and further strengthens the position of non-shareholder
constituencies. 174
Second, the German information market is less developed than that of the
U.S. 7 5 German securities laws are not disclosure based, contributing to a
6 Charny, supra note 5, at 159-60.
" Franck Chantayan, An Examination of American and German Corporate Law Norms, 16
ST. JOHN"S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 431,447 (2002).
166 Id.
67 See Lee Poison, Development of Corporate Governance in the Context of "Full
Disclosure" in the United States, 10 U.S.-MEX. LJ. 135 (2002).
I" Corinne A. Franzen, Increasing the Competitiveness of U.S. Corporations: Is Bank
Monitoring the Answer?, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 271, 291 (1993).
" See Michael Quint, Wall Street; M.&A. Redux, With a Difference, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
1993, § 3, at 11.
70 Kim, supra note 125, at 379 (characterizing German markets as "deficient").
"7 Id. at 380.
'" Id. See also Chantayan, supra note 165, at 445-46 (stating that diverse public ownership
of German corporations is still a rarity).
173 Kim, supra note 125, at 380.
'74 Loewenstein, supra note 136, at 1673.
'7 Kim, supra note 125, at 381.
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scarcity of available information, which may be wrong or insufficient, and
penalties for misstatements under German law are less harsh than under U.S.
laws. 7 6 Accounting standards have not been uniform in the past and new EU
directives do not reach the level of U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP).17 Until recently, insider trading has been "widespread
and unregulated,"' 7 lending support to the presence of material, nonpublic
information.
Third, there is no German central market regulator like the U.S. SEC. 79
Fourth, existing disclosure standards are lax compared to those in Great Britain
and the United States."s Fifth, German capital has been described as
"patient,"'' meaning Germans tend to be more tolerant of management
inefficiencies before moving capital out of a corporation. Finally, individual
stock ownership in Germany is surprisingly sparse when compared to the
United States.' The underdevelopment of the German markets is intertwined
with the power and influence of banks, which have prevented the need for
capital markets in the past.
Indication of the superiority of U.S. markets and disclosure standards can
be found in the recent trend of f'nn cross-listing on U.S. markets. "Issuers
migrate to U.S. exchanges because by voluntarily subjecting themselves to the
United States' higher disclosure standards and greater threat of enforcement
(both by private and public enforcers), they partially compensate for weak
protection of minority investors under their own jurisdictions' laws and
176 id.
'7 See id.
|7' id,
' Id at 382.
Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of "Germany, Inc. ": The Case of Executive Pay,
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497, 534 (2001) (discussing the issue of executive pay).
"' Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance: A Glimpse
at German Supervisory Boards, 70 TUL L. REV. 1819, 1820 (1996).
'" Loewenstein, supra note 136, at 1678.
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thereby achieve a higher market valuation."' In effect, firms trade freedom
from regulation for higher growth prospects.
The banks' influence over corporations and the corresponding lack of
markets also affect the context of mergers and acquisitions. Major corporate
changes in Germany are nearly impossible without cooperation of the banks. 4
Hostile takeovers are uncommon and proxy contests for control of the board
rare.' 85 Bearer shares make direct contact with the target nearly impossible." 6
Banks have little incentives to consent to mergers or takeovers-if they are not
satisfied with incumbent management, they can use their own power to replace
the Management Board.8 7 Furthermore, the codetermination laws, 8 8 voting
rights restrictions,8 9 and financial assistance problems90 restrict acquisitions
of German companies.
In summary, the German markets are not effective monitors of German
management. While it appears that the German system looks unfavorably on
.83 John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1766
(2002) (showing that strong legal standards attract issuers to list in the U.S. markets and that the
ability of European exchanges to attract foreign listings has declined). Germany had a "high
disclosure" market, the Neuer Markt. However, lacking enforcement via a central market
regulator or private actions, the exchange has been marred by scandals. Confidence in the
market dropped with its capitalization and it closed in 2003. Id at 1804-05. See also, e.g.,
Tanja Santucci, Extending Fair Disclosure to Foreign Issuers: Corporate Governance and
Finance Implications for German Companies, 2002 CoLuM. Bus. L. REv. 499 (providing an
example of the demands to which cross-listed firms are subjected). There is indication that a
certain cultural hegemony has existed in favor of the U.S. model of corporate governance. See
James A. Fanto, Persuasion and Resistance: The Use of Psychology by Anglo-American
Corporate Governance Advocates in France, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1041 (2002).
'8 Kim, supra note 125, at 383.
Andre, supra note 181, at 1820.
186 Kim, supra note 125, at 383.
" Id at 384.
I8 d. at 384-85 (stating that worker representation on the board is often supportive of
incumbent management in the merger context, presumably because mergers are often followed
by layoffs). See also Loewenstein, supra note 136, at 1681 (stating that where a takeover has
the potential to affect labor, labor's influence may lead to a fierce battle that the opponent might
well want to avoid), and MARY O'SULI.VAN, CONTESTS FORCORPORATECONTROL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC PERFRMANCE IN THE UNrrED STATES AND GERMANY (2000).
'9 Kim, supra note 125, at 385 (describing voting rights restrictions limiting the vote of a
single shareholder to 5% or 10% as "poison pills"). While shares held by banks are affected,
they still retain enormous power due to the shares held in deposit contracts and voted by the
banks.
'9' Id at 387.
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shifts in corporate control' 9' and leaves German management more freedom to
act than U.S. management," ideally the power of banks replaces the
monitoring function falling on markets in the United States.
D. Board of Directors and Supervisory Board: Internal Monitors
In a U.S. corporation, the board of directors represents the shareholders'
interests before management. By electing directors, shareholders influence the
broad policies of the corporation: by enacting and amending its certificate of
incorporation and bylaws, shareholders give the board directives.'93 The
addition of outside directors should ensure a degree of impartiality in the
supervision of incumbent management.
Generally, the board of directors' duties are twofold; it owes shareholders
a fiduciary duty of care and a duty of loyalty in dispensing its service to the
corporation. While it is difficult to state the extent of the fiduciary duties
succinctly, there is some agreement that the duty of care requires management
to exercise reasonable skill and diligence in monitoring corporate affairs and
in taking board action."9 The duty of loyalty requires management to put the
interests of the shareholders before their own when conflicts of interests
arise. 95
The monitoring function of the board has not worked as well as expected.'9
Incumbent management selects the candidates for board positions, often
friends and business partners. Thus, the beholden board might not be diligent
in supervising management for fear of losing their board position and out of
desire to give incumbent management the level of deference that they would
like to have in running their own companies.'9 Furthermore, staggered
"I Id. at 388.
'92 Loewenstein, supra note 136, at 1683.
"1 JACOBS, supra note 114.
"'1 See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L.
EcON. & ORG. 55, 56 (1991).
'95 Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996).
'" See Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 CoLUM. L. REv. 1283, 1285 (1998)
(stating that U.S. boards have traditionally been passive and management dominated, but
indicating this has started to change in the last decade or two).
" See Benfield, supra note 131, at 631; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board?
Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002) (discussing the
effects of group dynamics in corporate boards of directors).
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director terms, 98 often provided for in the certificate of incorporation, can
make it exceedingly difficult to completely replace the board if it does not
serve the shareholders. If staggered terms are provided for, shareholders
cannot elect an entirely new board of directors at one time.
In the German AG, the Supervisory Board usually contains representatives
of the major banks financing the particular business.' 99 Thus, in addition to
wielding the traditional power of lenders, banks also control corporations in
an ownership capacity. German Management Boards are not very likely to
bear in mind the interests of small investors, but are more likely to focus on the
interests of key shareholders over minority shareholders."°° "One German
banker went so far as to say, 'Shareholders are dumb when they buy stock and
impertinent because they also want a dividend.' This is not to say that
individual investors are always ignored, only that their voice is a faint one that
is rarely heard." ''
The German Supervisory Board places a check on the Management Board,
which is entrusted with the quotidian management of the corporation.2" 2 The
Supervisory Board is available for intervention in situations of crisis. The
intention is that by creating a body that oversees the Management Board, the
interests of the shareholders are safeguarded. 3 Although crises are,
hopefully, not on the daily order, the Supervisory Board and Management
Board are supposed to interact to enable the Supervisory Board to review
management's decisions. The Supervisory Board exercises its power to
request reports of any nature, often quarterly, and reviews balance sheets.'
Furthermore, recall the Supervisory Board's ability to demand approval in case
of certain management decisions.
As mentioned previously, banks have great influence over the membership
of the Supervisory Board.' Together, the access to information about the
corporation's internal workings and the veto power give German banks
insights into the internal workings of a corporation that U.S. shareholders do
not possess. The information given to the banks via the Supervisory Board
"' Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 141(d) (2002).
199 Butler, supra note 8. While not unthinkable that a U.S. board will have representation by
lenders, chiefly bond holders, that scenario occurs only upon default of bond covenants.
200 Chantayan, supra note 165, at 445.
201 Id.
Id. at 439.
203 Id.
2o' See Baums, supra note 124, at 510.
205 Gordon, supra note 124, at 192.
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remains confidential. U.S. corporations, on the other hand, are not required to
pass along internal information and are not bound to do so in cases of
confidential information.2' This unique insight into a German corporation's
governance provides shareholders unparalleled access. While such power is
in the hands of few-the banks--other investors nonetheless benefit. In the
end, the bank's interest is the same as that of the shareholder: to maximize
returns on investment while keeping risk at an acceptable level. On the other
hand, the influence of banks over the Supervisory Board risks that the board
will be beholden to the bank."7
It is to be expected that the interest of banks as lenders turns the Supervi-
sory Board into a powerful watchdog. This system, however, is not without
fault. The Management Board is given great latitude; 8 meetings of the
Supervisory Board may be too infrequent to be effective;' and the Manage-
ment Board's replies to Supervisory Board requests for information are often
evasive.210 Coupled with the fact that management is difficult to remove,"
management is generally able to operate free from fear of repercussions.
While the German system in theory provides for closer supervision, it does so
at the price of efficiency. Banks as lenders are less risk tolerant than equity
shareholders, reducing the possible gains accruing to shareholders under
American corporate governance.
E. Availability of Courts as Monitors: The Effects of Legal and Equitable
Redress
The availability of judicial redress is arguably the ultimate mechanism
ensuring compliance with various corporate duties of care and accountability.
The aforementioned forces, the system of separated ownership, constituencies
of various interests, the market forces, and the built-in checks of the corporate
o See iU.
Chantayan, supra note 165, at 441. The problem is underscored by the fact that a small
number of individuals serve on a large number of Supervisory Boards creating a "clubby
atmosphere." Andre, supra note 181, at 1822.
§ 82(1) AktG (stating that management's authority cannot be limited).
Mark J. Roe, Corporate Governance: German Codetermination and German Securities
Markets, 5 CoLuM. J. EUR. L. 199, 202 (1999).
210 Chantayan, supra note 165, at 441. See also Singhof & Seiler, supra note 7, at 559-62
(expressing doubt about the effectiveness of the Supervisory Board in the control and
supervision of management).
211 § 84(3) AktG (allowing removal of management only for cause).
2 Chantayan, supra note 165, at 440.
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governance regimes are expected to fail in some cases-the legal system will
provide the proverbial "last resort." Both Germany and Delaware effectively
restrict access to the courts, albeit though different mechanisms.
In the case of the U.S. board of directors, court review of directorial duties
is limited by the business judgment rule, a presumption that the board and
management's decisions are made with sound business judgment.213 Since the
board is not considered an insurer of success,214 to overcome the presumption,
a shareholder will have to show fraud, illegality, bad faith, or gross
negligence.2t 5 It is difficult for plaintiffs to meet this exacting burden designed
to preserve risk-taking by management. Combined with the prohibitive cost
of shareholder litigation, the presumption of the business judgment rule makes
judicial action a viable alternative to influence management's action only in
cases of egregious misconduct.216 On the other hand, U.S. courts are more
rigorous in the enforcement of breaches of duty of care.2"7 No business
judgment presumptions apply in this case and a mere showing of conflict of
interest will be enough to implicate court review.
German courts are less deferential to management than U.S. courts
operating under the business judgment rule.218 "German courts do not hesitate
to question whether members of the [Management Board] took unreasonable
risks or if [they] crossed a borderline drawn by the corporation's benefits. 2 9
This may lead to the application of the court's own business judgment, a
situation U.S. courts try to avoid.2 2' But while purporting to apply an objective
standard, there is always the danger that the judge's personal "subjective risk
attitudes" or the benefit of hindsight enters the decision.22' It is for these
reasons that U.S. courts have imposed the broad and powerful presumptions
of the business judgment rule.
U.S. corporations also face judicial scrutiny under the Securities Acts.
These acts are arguably the U.S. substitute for the judicial audit of German
Stock Corporations at formation.222
213 Smith v. Van Gorkorn, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
214 Butler, supra note 8, at 588.
215 Smith, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
216 See Benfield, supra note 131, at 623.
217 Butler, supra note 8, at 591.
218 id
219 id.
2o See id.
221 See Butler, supra note 8, at 591.
Id. at 592.
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However, the former protect the integrity of the security market,
while the latter mainly protect creditors. But if we keep in mind
that U.S. corporations raise capital through the stock market,
while German Aktiengesellschaften heavily depend on loans,
both kinds of regulations protect the main financiers of the
corporations and thus, in return, secure the sources of corporate
funding.223
The U.S. Securities Act of 1933 imposes liability for misstatements of material
fact in registration statements.2 ' The scope of liability under Rule lOb-5 of
the Act and its regulations is broad.
In the United States, there are two primary avenues for bringing shareholder
suits "neither of which" exist in Germany: the derivative suit25 and the direct
class action. In derivative suits, the shareholder sues on behalf of the
corporation and any recovery is for the benefit of the corporation. 226 The
shareholder is allowed to assert the corporation's rights on the theory that the
board of directors failed to do so.227 In direct class actions, on the other hand,
the shareholder asserts his own rights as against the defendants and is allowed
to recover personally. The aforementioned separation of management and
ownership leads to frequent lawsuits, and "[a]s a way to align management's
interests with shareholders," U.S. law has permitted shareholders to sue to
redress the damages caused by managerial misbehavior.228 Some commenta-
tors have called into question the effectiveness of derivative suits in controlling
management, given their high procedural and substantive requirements.
Nonetheless, they are powerful and threatening devices in the hands of
shareholders.229
While German law also places strict standards on review of management,
derivative suits and class actions are not available to redress misbehavior.'
223 Id. at 592-93.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (2000).
See Singhof & Seiler, supra note 7, at 544 (providing a good overview of U.S. derivative
litigation).
"' See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
2v Id.
22 Butler, supra note 8, at 598.
Rainer Kraakman et al., When are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interest?, 82 GEO.
L.J. 1733 (1994).
230 Loewenstein, supra note 136, at 1674 (stating that outside the U.S., shareholder derivative
action is rare, resulting in a lesser degree of accountability of directors to shareholders).
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Several remedial doctrines create further obstacles under German law.23' For
example, the conceptualization of the corporation as separate body232 is applied
more rigorously in Germany than in the United States. In Germany, the
contractual relationship exists between management and the corporation and
not between management and shareholders.2 33 Consequently, management
owes duties only to the corporation, and not its shareholders. Therefore, the
right to sue lies with the corporation only. "The fact that a breach of duty by
management usually has a negative impact on the value of the shares, and with
this, on the shareholders, is irrelevant, because as an indirect harm, it is
considered to be outside the scope of the pertinent doctrinal concept. ,2 34 Like
in the United States, German management, vested with the sole power to
pursue claims against the corporation, is unlikely to sue itself. The Supervi-
sory Board, however, has the power to initiate suit.235 Yet, the Supervisory
Board has no duty to file suit and may, in any case, be entangled in the issue.
If the Supervisory Board decides not to sue, then the shareholders may initiate
suit by majority vote.236 But since the Supervisory Board is elected by the
shareholders, there may be reluctance on the part of the shareholders to bring
suit after the board declined to do so.237
It is also worth mentioning that Germany allocates the cost of litigation to
the losing party; contingency fees are not permitted. This system might be
another hurdle to suit, as litigation costs quickly become enormous. Since the
corporation will recover in case of success and the shareholder will personally
be liable for fees in case of loss, this hurdle is large indeed.
In summary, German law gives shareholders slightly less protection than
U.S. law provides its shareholders.238 However, other protective mechanisms
partially replace the need for derivative and class actions. The Supervisory
Board and the watchful eyes of dominant banks act as a check on
"1 Butler, supra note 8, at 600.
232 § I AktG.
" See Richard M. Buxbaum, Extension of Parent Company Shareholders' Rights to
Participate in the Governance of Subsidiaries, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 511, 513 (1983); Butler,
supra note 8, at 600.
"' Butler, supra note 8, at 600.
2 §§ 78, 112 AktG.
236 § 147 AktG.
Butler, supra note 8, at 601.
28 Id. See also Singhof & Seiler, supra note 7, at 463 (stating that the net effect of placing
the burden of proof on the German Management Board is that they will be less likely to act
opportunistically).
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management.239 While the German two-tier board structure, including creditor
and labor representation, is a powerful device, arguably providing more
protection than the single board of the U.S. corporation, the tool may fail in
those circumstances in which management mischievously fails to provide the
Supervisory Board with truthful information. History has shown that the
Supervisory Board generally fulfills its management function, but there have
been serious failures in the past.2' Critics maintain that the Management and
Supervisory Boards have become too close and do not function as separate
organs effectively, jeopardizing management functions.2 " The Supervisory
Board, furthermore, has become more beholden to management than
previously and now often includes friends and business contacts.242 Lastly,
even if the Supervisory Board effectively monitors management, it still does
not effectively represent the shareholders, due to the various codetermination
laws.
F. Recapitulation
Separation of ownership and control is a strong feature of U.S. corporate
governance. By creating separate owning and managing constituencies, the
owners are encouraged to closely watch management. In the United States, the
SEC complicates the owner's monitoring function, through proxy regulations.
In Germany, the separation of ownership from control is less clear. Banks, as
primary owners and as trustees of individual stock deposit accounts, own and
vote large contingents of stock. While banks could wield tremendous power,
they are deferential to management. Overall, the voice of minority investors
is muffled.
Delaware corporations have two major constituencies: shareholders and
management. In larger corporations, debt holders form a third faction.
Germany adds labor as a constituency. Labor representation on the Supervi-
sory Board is intended to give labor a voice in corporate governance. It also
allows labor to exert control on the actions of management. Labor's
conservatism and one-sided goal of preservation of the employment force,
239 Butler, supra note 8, at 602.
24 Id. (giving an example of a decision of the Bundesgerichtshof, NEuE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENZErrscHRIFr 1629 (1980), where the members of the Aufsichtsrat were held liable for
proposing that management give securities to a company with doubtful credit rating).
241 Thomas Raiser, PflichtundErmessen vonAufsichtsratsmitgliedern, 49NEUEJURISTISCHE
WOCHENZErrscHRIFr 552, 553 (1996).
242 See Andre, supra note 181, at 1823.
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however, have stalled transactions and impeded the efficacy of the German
corporation.
The U.S. markets constitute a powerful monitoring force on U.S. corpora-
tions. U.S. markets are diversified and efficient. The ability of capital to leave
poorly managed firms provides incentives to maintain management quality.
Futhermore, SEC rules and active media create and maintain an information
market that supports the efficiency of U.S. markets. The German market is not
a good monitor. Poor debt markets perpetuate the importance of German
banks and public float is small when compared to U.S. companies. Further-
more, accounting standards and the absence of a central market regulator lead
to a comparatively less reliable information market.
The board of directors has been an apparent weakness of the U.S. system
of corporate governance. Until recently, some corporations lacked adequate
outside directors and the independence of the board was questionable.
Germany's two-tiered structure is intended to provide an additional level of
monitoring. A two-tier model of governance should work well if the
monitoring tier is a vigilant observer of the management tier. As it stands,
however, banks dominate the Supervisory Board at the cost of minority
investors. Bank employees sit on a majority of Supervisory Boards, yet give
management wide latitude. The banks' pronounced presence on the boards
also protects and perpetuates ineffective management in office.
Both the United States and Germany restrict access to their courts in
questions of corporate governance. In the United States, the business judgment
rule acts as a presumption that management's decisions are the result of sound
business judgment. The rule prevents courts from addressing all but the most
egregious instances of misconduct. Furthermore, the SEC allows suits based
on its regulations. All suits may be had as derivative or direct actions. In
Germany, the business judgment rule is unknown. Other legal doctrines, such
as the separate entity doctrine, the absence of class actions, and differing rules
regarding the award of attorney's fees, make suits about corporate governance
unlikely in Germany.
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IV. WHERE IS THE GERMAN ENRON?
A. The U.S. Corporate Failures: Enron, World Corn, Tyco and Other Trouble
To be able to appreciate the recent corporate failure and the significance to
German and U.S. corporate law, it will be necessary to introduce Enron" 3 and
other corporate failures to give some indication about the nature of the failure
of the system.
After the long market rally of the mid-and late 1990s, rapidly falling stock
prices surprised Enron and ultimately led to its demise. Enron extensively
issued special purpose vehicles to take debt off the balance sheets. With an
unorthodox but legitimate approach, Enron used its own stock as collateral to
secure the investments. 2" As the share price declined, the collateral Enron put
up declined in value. To avoid default, Enron had to issue more stock to its
special vehicle creditors. This further diluted its stock value. Enron's
financial structure began to unravel and investors and concerned analysts
looked more closely at its accounting practices. This lead to the discovery of
Enron's use of special purpose vehicles. Enron later declared bankruptcy. u5
Arthur Andersen, Enron's accounting firm and auditor, was indicted, and
found guilty of obstruction of justice, pointing to possibly wide-spread
collusion between corporations and their accountants and auditors.2
Enron was not the only corporation for which questionable business
practices led to a steady decline once stock prices started to fall. WorldCom,
a large telecommunications company, has since filed the largest bankruptcy in
corporate history." Adelphia, a cable communications company, essentially
collapsed because of occurrences of what is considered widespread fraud by
its major shareholders, the Rigas family." Tyco provides another example of
the kinds of problems involving corporate govemance.2 9 Furthermore, there
were indications that stock analysts and investment banks were not as
independent as free markets demanded.' Analysts took money from
I Peter C. Clapman, How Corporate Governance Issues Impacted on the Demise ofEnron,
SG052 ALI-ABA 55 (2002).
244 See Weil, supra note 12.
24 Enron, supra note 12; Dynergy, supra note 12.
6 Andersen, supra note 12; Kurt Eichenwald, supra note 12.
247 Cornwell, supra note 13.
248 Johnson, supra note 15.
24 Morning Edition, supra note 15.
Randall Smith & Dan Morse, Deals & Deal Makers: Merrill Lynch Fires Analyst over
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corporations in exchange for promoting and recommending their stock as
investment grade.
While the methods that led to the financial failures differed from case to
case, management misbehavior provides a common denominator. Board
failures reached from outright fraud to a simple failure to inform themselves
adequately. For example, the "Enron Board of Directors . . . failed to
appreciate the financial condition of Enron because it did not insist on
complete, clear explanations of the transactions it approved and the financial
statements the company issued."25' As such, U.S. corporate failures are
symptomatic of the wide latitude and independence of management.
B. Recent Changes in U.S. Law, Regulations, and Listing Requirements
The U.S. reaction to its corporate failures was immediate and is best
characterized by (1) a strengthening of the existing disclosure policies and (2)
greater leverage in enforcing the regulations along with harsher punishments
for their violation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act252 provides the symptomatic
corrections needed to address the recent corporate failures, by following and
strengthening the SEC disclosure philosophy and regime. Specifically, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act reinforces the In re Caremark53 requirement of a
compliance program and attending personal director liability. It also provides
charges regarding:
" CEO/CFO certification of company reports,
" Forfeiture of executive compensation and trading profits,
" Disclosure of trading activity by insiders,
" Insider today and blackout periods,
" Conflict of interest provisions,
" Off-balance sheet transactions,
" Federalization of audit committees--creation of better "watch-
dog"'25 and an Accounting Board,
Disclosure, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2002, at C5.
21 Wachtell etal., Memoranda on Corporate GovernanceandAudit CommitteesPost-Enron,
in Disclosure & Other Lessons Learned After Enron: What You Need to Know Now to File Your
10-K & Other Forms, 1303 PL/ CORP 345 (2002).
252 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
I3 in re Caremark Int'l., Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996).
5 See also Gregory S. Rowland, Note, Earnings Management, the SEC, and Corporate
Governance: Director Liability Arising From the Audit Committee Report, 102 CoiM. L. REV.
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* Disclosure of audit committee expert,
" Enhanced periodic review,
" Rapid disclosure of financial changes,
" Rules of professional conduct for lawyers,
* Code of ethics for senior financial officers,
• Criminal penalties, and
" Whistle blower protection. 5
The new requirements will also affect all cross-listed firms, which in the case
of Germany leads to conflicts between U.S. and German requirements.256
A second avenue of substantial change in U.S. financial markets is the
changes in the listing requirements of major U.S. exchanges. These changes
complement the stature of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The NASDAQ Board has
approved changes designed to enhance investor confidence and has submitted
the changes to the SEC for approval. 257 The NYSE has pursued a similar
path.
168 (2002) (arguing that there is no potential for disproportionate expansion of audit committee
member's potential liability).
23S Carole Basri et al., From a Corporate Governance and Compliance Viewpoint: A
Practical Guide to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002-Ethics After Enron: Protecting Your Firm
or Corporate Law Department: A Satellite Program, 126 PLI/NY 71 (2002); see also, e.g.,
Justin L. Bastian, Dramatic Changes to Corporate Governance for Public Companies and New
Framework for Oversight of Auditors-Understanding the Securities Laws 2002, 1334
PLI/CoRP 167 (2002).
2"6 Coffee, supra note 183, at 1826 (showing that the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements of the
audit committee create a "mismatch for civil law corporations: Members of the managing board
are barred from service on the audit committees [by local law], and members of the supervisory
board, who may also be conflicted, are given powers [by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act] that few civil
law corporations would willingly entrust to them").
" Summary of NASDAQ Corporate Governance Proposals-The New Disclosure and
Corporate Governance Regime: What Every Corporate and Securities LawyerMust Know Now,
1335 PLI/CoRP 413 (2002) (addressing changes regarding stock options, loans to officers and
directors, increased board independence, heightened standards of independence for audit
committees, a strengthened role of independent directors in compensation and nomination
decisions, a mandate for director continuing education, transparency for foreign corporations,
establishment of corporate codes of conduct, etc.); but see ABA Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities, Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate
Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487 (2002) (opining that the route taken by NASDAQ and NYSE
is not the best and advocating a regime of practice guidelines instead).
" Corporate Governance Rule Proposals Reflecting Recommendations from the NYSE
Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee as Approved by the NYSE Board
of Directors, August 1, 2002-The New Disclosure and Corporate Governance Regime: What
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The U.S. response to its corporate failures evidences U.S. confidence in the
current corporate governance regime.
C. German Corporate Failures
Germany has also had its share of corporate failures, several of which have
achieved a level of notoriety at least in the European press. While these
scandals exhibit a variety of problems, they do have a common basis. The
German banking system was involved in each of the scandals and arguably
contributed to the failure.
Metallgesellschaft (MG) is an example of a corporate failure259 rescued
only by the effort of large banks contributing more than 1.5 billion dollars.2"
Without intervention, Germany's then fourteenth-largest industrial group
would surely have descended into bankruptcy.2" Deutsche Bank shouldered
the rescue effort but nonetheless became the target of criticism.2 2 Previously,
Deutsche Bank had offered special services for managing risk on the conglom-
erate's oil products, an area that led to massive losses.2 ' The Deutsche's
involvement is puzzling, because Ronaldo Schmitz of Deutsche Bank was also
the Supervisory Board chairman at MG and should have known of the
mounting losses.2" Mr. Schnitz was finally sued by MG's management, 265
Every Corporate and Securities Lawyer Must Know Now, 1335 PLIICORP 421 (2002)
(addressing changes regarding a majority of independent directors, the definition of independent
director, regular meeting of non-management directors, establishment of anominating/corporate
governance committee and an independent compensation committee, limitations of the fees that
audit committee members may receive, increased authority and responsibility of the audit
committee, increased shareholder voting on compensation plans, adoption and disclosure of
corporate governance guidelines, adoption of a code of conduct/ethics, disclosure of foreign
companies explaining differences from corporate governance practices followed by U.S.
companies, certification by CEO that there are no known violations of NYSE listing standards,
etc.).
I See Andrew Fisher, Metallgesellschaft: The Oil Deals that Crippled A German Metal-
Trading Giant, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, at 20; In the Line of Fire-Metallgesellschaft,
EuROMONEY, Mar. 1, 1994, at 40.
Germany pays more in MG rescue, TMES (London), Jan. 17, 1994, available at 1994 WL
11534772.
261 Id.
2 Id.
263 id.
264 Id.
26 Germany's Corporate whodunnit (pinning the blame for debts of Metallgesellschaft),
ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 1995, at 71.
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who were at the time under criminal investigation as well.266 U.S. academics
have blamed Metallgesellschaft's troubles on the Supervisory Board.267 After
shedding the conflicts, MG underwent a remarkable recovery.268
The.Schneider Affair269 of the mid-1990s is illustrative of a scandal that
focused on one person. Mr. Jurgen Schneider presided over a real estate
empire worth several billion dollars. 270 He obtained construction loans based
on forged paperwork and when the business failed he filed for bankruptcy with
$3.2 billion of debt.271 'The Schneider affair sent tremors through Germany's
financial community, raising alarms that lending institutions were too careless
with their biggest clients., 272 Deutsche Bank was criticized for its "loose
lending and lax supervision" and accepted the resignation of four of its
executives over the matter. 3 Schneider was sentenced to six years and nine
months in prison after a conviction for credit fraud and forgery.274
There has also been trouble at the engineering group KHD,2  where
international competition pushed prices so low that the company was forced
266 Germany Begins Inquiry: Troubles at Metallgesellschaft continue to surface, NAT'LPOST,
Jan. 11, 1994. at 8, available at 1994 WL 6182776.
267 Id.
268 Metallgeselischaft Out Of Sick Bay and Rallying: The company that was nearly
Germany's biggest corporate disaster is finding itself back in favor with investors who have sent
shares soaring 40% since May, NAT'L POST, Sept. 21, 1995, at 58, available at 1995 WL
4348185.
29 Nicholas Bray, Scandals Knock Deutsche Bank's Image, WALLST. J., July 5, 1994, at A8;
John Eisenhammer, All Fall Down: Jurgen Schneider Had Everything, INDEP. (London), June
17, 1995, at 34.
270 Associated Press, German real estate scandal ends with Schneiderfraud conviction, Dec.
23, 1997, available at 1997 WL 4898027; see also Terence Roth, Turmoil at Germany's
Schneider Takes Toll on Banks, Contractors and Others, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1994, at A10,
available at 1994 WL-WSJ 296870 (stating that not only German banks found themselves
exposed to the Schneider affair and detailing that Morgan Stanley's Frankfurt office was fearing
for its doors when unpaid contractors had slipped in with the predawn cleaning team and were
taking doors off hinges and carting them out of the building they had recently renovated for
property developer Juergen Schneider).
27' Roth, supra note 270.
272 d.
2 Germany Charges Schneider, Wife in Fraud Case, WALL ST. J. EuR., Jan. 7, 1997, at 3,
available at 1997 WL-WSJE 3804158.
274 Schneider given six yearsforfraud-Extradited property developer jailed in Germany's
biggestpost-warcorporatefraud trial, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1997, at Abstracts 02, available at
1997 WL 23648758.
27' See Deutsche stumbles again, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995, at 20; Colin Narbrough, Deutsche
Bank Debtor on the Brink, TIMES (London), Jan. 30, 1995.
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to accept contracts for building factories at levels below the break even point.
Accountants then "corrected" these negative balances on the books.2 76 Wall
Street Journal Europe asked: "Is anybody minding the store at Germany,
Inc.? 2 77 German banks intervened to rescue the firm, in particular Deutsche
Bank, who owned 48.7 percent of KHD's shares.278 With such a large share,
Deutsche Bank should have been very aware of the events at KHD, especially
since Deutsche provided KHD's chairman of the Supervisory Board. But
"KHD offers a prime example of the lack of supervisory control and of
management screening itself off from responsibility.... There's a clique of
supervisors who exert no real control." 79
In 1994, sports flooring manufacturer Balsam' filed for insolvency.28" '
Balsam's management, including chairperson Friedel Balsam, ran the business
into $1.6 billion of debt and were later indicted for "falsifying orders, bills and
other documents to obtain credit on accounts receivable." '282
Most recently, Deutsche Telekom, the privatized state telecommunications
provider, has also made news. Although Deutsche Telekom has not collapsed,
it has seen its share values decline by ninety percent over the past two years.283
Ousted CEO Ron Sommer contributed to his own demise by failing to cut
Deutsche Telecom's sixty-seven billion euro debt, dragging out the sale of a
cable television network, and "spend[ing] lavishly" in the acquisition of
struggling U.S. mobile-phone company, VoiceStream. 4 Deutsche Telekom
shares are Germany's most widely held stock and were "supposed to be the
harbinger of a new business culture in a nation traditionally averse to stock
2716 Brandon Mitchener & Matt Marshall, Germany, Inc.: KHD Debacle Thrusts Supervisory
Boards Back Into the Hot Seat: Surprise Losses at Firm Revive Doubts About Effectiveness Of
Corporate Governance, WALL ST. J. EUR., May 30, 1996, at 1, available at 1996 WL-WSJE
3342447.
277 id.
278 Id.
279 id.
I David Waller, Light Escape Likely for Balsam Bankers: How Germany's Newest Scandal
Contrasts to the Schneider Case, FIN. TIMES, June 9, 1994, at 4.
231 Germany's Balsam Faces Debt, Continues Search for Buyer, WALL ST. J. EUR., Aug. 2,
1994, at 5, available at 1994 WL-WSJE 2035234.
22 Id; see also PW Germany plans suit against Procedo, Balsam, INT'L Accr. BuuL, Jan.
24, 1995, at 1.
" Matthew Karnitschnig &Christopher Rhoads, Disconnected: CEO Ron Sommerls Forced
to Leave Deutsche Telekom, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2002, at Al.
284 Id. See also Deutsche Telekom's Sommer May Seek Another Big Telecommunications,
Deal, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2000, at B6.
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investing."2 5 Political pressure led to the eventual ouster of the widely
unpopular Ron Sommer. 6 The German government continues to hold a forty-
three percent stake in Deutsche Telekom.27
These scandals created an atmosphere of investor unease and attracted
political attention. Specifically, a series of smaller scandals not discussed here
have deeply troubled and eventually led to the closing of Germany's technol-
ogy bourse Neuer Markt. s The scandals and corporate failures underscore the
problems of self-regulation and lack of enforcement" as well as difficulties
with the way Supervisory Boards currently function.
D. Recent Changes in German Law
In response to German corporate failures, there has been significant
discussion about whether German corporate law should undergo changes.
Opinions on the issue differ.2" Yet, the Aktiengesetz has undergone
significant changes in the last decade, some of which were intended to address
the aforementioned problems. Most significantly, Germany is trying to lessen
the influence of banks on corporations.291
25 Karnitschnig & Rhoads, supra note 283.
286 Id. See also Matthew Karnitschig et al., Deutsche Telekom CEO Sommer Faces New
Pressure to Resign, WAI. ST. J., July 10, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3400218;
Carol J. Williams, Deutsche Telekom CEO Is Forced Out of Office Executives: Sommer resigns,
elbowed aside by politics and shareholders angry about the 90% drop in Germany's most widely
held stock, L.A. lIMES, July 17, 2002, at Cl, available at 2002 WL 2490326.
2 Kamitschnig & Christopher Rhoads, supra note 283.
28 Jack Ewing et al., The Neuer Maria: Can It Hang On?, Bus. WK. (INT'L ED.), July 30,
2001, at 18, available at 2001 WL 2208284. See also Alfred Kueppers, A Busy Bidder in
Germany Highlights Flaws in Neuer Marki's Efforts to Challenge Nasdaq, WAIL ST. J., Aug.
6, 2001, at CII (providing illustrations of how speculators and market manipulators exploited
Neuer Markt's weaknesses); Alfred Kueppers, Deutsche Boerse Sets Up New Rules for Neuer
Markt, WALL ST. J., July 19,2001, at A19.
289 Coffee, supra note 183, at 1805-06.
1 See, e.g., Sanford M. Jacoby, Employee Representation and Corporate Governance: A
Missing Link, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 449, 460 (2001) (indicating a suspicion that the
European model of corporate governance entails substantial inefficiencies and would not be
sustainable in the absence of extra-economic legal constraints and social norms).
2I Chantayan, supra note 165, at 448.
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In 1998, the Gesetz zur Kontrolle im Untemehmensbereich (KonTraG) 292
introduced changes to the internal control mechanisms, limited the exercise of
proxies by banks, and introduced limiting provisions on the issuance of stock
options to board members.2' Those changes were brought about by (i) the
failure of the Supervisory Board and auditors to recognize early and prevent
dramatic collapses and bankruptcies and (ii) fear of the power of the banks
over German businesses due to their depository voting rights.2 ' The 1998
amendments largely affected the Management and Supervisory Boards. They
reduced the size of each board allowing for greater access to information,
strengthened the control of shareholder meetings, modified the depository
voting by banks, improved the quality of account audits, and amended the
regulations dealing with the acquisition of the corporation's own stock.295
Yet, changes to the controversial two-tier system itself remain unlikely.2'
Historically, the German legislature has been supportive of the system despite
doubts about its economic efficiency and effectiveness as social policy.297
Furthermore, German political sentiment has been that economic efficiency
has been worth sacrificing to "protect" non-shareholder constituencies.29
German commentators have frequently complained of the influence of
banks and maintained that cross-holdings between German corporations are
not desirable.' German corporations tend to hold significant amounts of
shares of other German corporations, creating corporate interconnections. This
further increases the inflexibility of German corporate governance.3
Legislation introduced in 2001 has abolished a fifty percent tax on capital
292 See Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG), V.
27.4.1998 (BGB1. I S.786). See also Petter Hommelhof & Daniela Mattheus, Coporate
Governance nach dem KonTraG, 43 DIE AKTiENGESE-,uscHAFr [AG] 249 (1998); Bernhard
Pellens, Andreas Bonse & Joachim Gassen, Perspektiven der deutschen
Konzernsregelung-Auswirlangen des Kapitalaufnahmeerlecihterungsgesetzes unddes Gesetzes
zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmens Bereich, 51 DER BETRIEB [DB] 785 (1998).
"' York Schnorbus, Tracking Stock in Germany: Is German Corporate Law Flexible Enough
to Adopt American Financial Innovations?, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 541, 586 (2001).
2 See Butler, supra note 8, at 559.
295 Id.
I Loewenstein, supra note 136, at 1677 (citing Ellen Thalman, Shareholder Value Loses
Favor, WALLST. J. EUR., July 31,2001, at 13, available at 2001 WL-WSJE 21834331); Andre,
supra note 181, at 1821.
297 Loewenstein, supra note 136, at 1676.
29 Id. at 1676-77.
29 Id.'at 1679; see Singhof & Seiler, supra note 7.
See Singhof & Seiler, supra note 7.
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gains companies obtain from selling equity stakes in other companies and had
the effect of encouraging firms to reduce their cross holdings. 301
German corporations are trying to broaden their shareholder base.0 2
Germans have historically been more reluctant than Americans to invest in
stock. This is likely because German investors are more risk averse than
Americans. 303 To encourage participation in the market, shareholder voting
restrictions are being eliminated,3°" and the eight German exchanges are trying
to move closer towards the dominating Frankfurt exchange.0 ' There has also
been some talk about tougher disclosure standards,05 which would likely
increase the market capitalization of German corporations and encourage
investment.
The changes to German corporate law are piecemeal and do not go far
enough to remedy the deep-seated problems. As the above described scandals
show, the banks continue to have great influence on German corporations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The functions of corporate governance, as described above, are threefold:
(1) to provide a check on senior management, (2) to provide a nexus between
the corporation and its shareholders, and (3) to satisfy the demands of various
constituencies such as directors, officers, employees, creditors, and other
stakeholders. 3°' Each system involves complex trade-offs between the
competing virtues of a governance system: flexibility vs. stability, innovation
vs. predictable success.308
The German and U.S. systems take different approaches to monitoring
management within their respective corporate government structures. This
raises the question of whether German mechanisms for controlling managers
Cheffins, supra note 180, at 502-03.
o Andre, supra note 181, at 1821.
303 See Singhof & Seiler, supra note 7, at 542 (commenting generally on German investor
conservatism); see also Christina Escher-Weingart, The Development of Corporate Governance
in Germany-Some Annotations to Jeffrey Gordon, 5 COLuM. J. EuR. L. 243, 245-46 (1999)
(noting that loss in two world wars led to economic instability historically keeping Germans
away from capital markets).
0 Andre, supra note 181, at 1821.
305Id..
0 David Woodruff, Investor Demand for Details of Executive Pay Helps Change the Rules,
WALLST. J. EUR., Sept. 11, 2000, at 27.
3 See Charny, supra note 5, at 145.
m Id. at 146.
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are inferior, equivalent, or superior to those employed in the United States. 30 9
The German system, in theory or on paper, is a system that appears more
effective in monitoring management. The reality, however, is that bank
domination and concentrated stock ownership give German management wide
latitude in handling business, encourage collusion between banks and business,
and dangerously concentrate ownership and control.
Separation of ownership and control is a strong feature of U.S. corporate
governance. By creating separate ownership and management constituencies,
the owners are encouraged to closely watch management. In the United States
that monitoring role is complicated, but not made impossible, by SEC proxy
regulations. The SEC regulations greatly increase the transaction costs of
shareholders communicating with each other. In Germany, the separation of
ownership from control is less clear. Banks own and vote large contingents of
stock, both as primary owners and as trustees of individual stock deposit
accounts. That concentration of ownership leads to a vigorous and powerful
exertion of the banks' interest. Yet, the reality is different. Banks, through
their presence on Supervisory Boards, leave Management Boards wide
discretion. The concentration of shares in the hands of the banks, combined
with the deferential attitude towards banks of individual deposit account
owners, creates a class of passive minority investors. The voice of these
minority investors is muffled.
The prototypical Delaware corporation has two constituencies: shareholders
and management. In larger corporations debt holders become a third pro forma
constituency. Germany adds to the mix a fourth group; labor representation
on the Supervisory Board is intended to give labor a voice in corporate
governance. It also allows labor to exert control on the actions of manage-
ment. Labor's conservatism and one-sided goal of preserving of the employ-
ment force, however, have stalled transactions and impeded the efficacy of the
German corporation.
The U.S. markets constitute a powerful monitoring force on U.S. corpora-
tions. U.S. markets are diversified and efficient. Capital flows freely. The
ability of capital to leave poorly managed firms provides an effective incentive
to maintain management quality and integrity. Furthermore, SEC rules
requiring complete disclosure, as well as active media, create and maintain an
information market that supports the efficiency of U.S. markets. German
markets are not a good monitor. Poor debt markets perpetuate the importance
of German banks. Public float is small when compared to U.S. companies.
" Singhof & Seiler, supra note 7.
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Furthermore, accounting standards and the absence of a central market
regulator lead to a comparatively less reliable information market.
The board of directors has been an apparent weakness of the U.S. system
of corporate governance. Until recently some corporations lacked an adequate
number of outside directors and the independence of the board of directors
was, in many cases, questionable. Germany's two-tiered structure is intended
to provide an additional level of monitoring. A two-tiered model of governance
should work well if the monitoring tier is a vigilant observer of the manage-
ment tier. As it stands, however, banks dominate the Supervisory Board at the
cost of minority investors. Bank employees sit on a majority of Supervisory
Boards and give management wide latitude. The banks' pronounced presence
on the boards also makes management difficult to remove.
Both the United States and Germany restrict access to their courts in
questions of corporate governance. In the United States, the business judgment
rule acts as a presumption that management's decisions are the result of sound
business judgment. The rule prevents courts from addressing all but the most
egregious instances of misconduct. Furthermore, the SEC allows suits based
on its regulations. All suits may be filed as derivative or direct actions. In
Germany, courts are less deferential to management. No business judgment
rule exists and courts are willing to second guess management's decisions.
Nonetheless, a variety of legal doctrines, such as the separate entity doctrine,
along with the absence of class actions, make suits over corporate governance
unlikely in Germany.
In both Germany and the United States, recent corporate failures indicate
that the respective governance systems are not free from fault. Illustrating the
path dependence of the two systems, the latest changes are not radical but
along the lines of the existing structure. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United
States primarily strengthens disclosure rules and provides harsher punishments
for violations. The Act falls in line with the existing SEC disclosure regime.
Also along existing lines are new listing requirements of the New York Stock
Exchange and the NASDAQ. Among the most significant contributions of the
new listing requirements are enhancements in the structure of the boards to
ensure independence and critical evaluation of numbers provided by manage-
ment. Germany's manifold changes came in effect over the course of the past
few years. Intended to reduce the influence of banks, they were not introduced
with the resolve of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S. Half-hearted piecemeal
changes have not succeeded in providing the promised relief. While banks'
importance is reduced, they do remain the predominant players on the German
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
corporate field. Deutsche Telekom's current state testifies to the changes that
must still occur in Germany.
What accounts for the lack of total corporate failures such as Enron,
WorldCom, and Tyco in Germany? Speculatively, the size of the German
economy and its comparatively smaller corporations would allow one to expect
fewer large corporate failures. Next, there is some indication that the German
and U.S. corporate cultures differ. 310 Such cultural differences might well be
the reason for the lack of large German corporate failures. In the particular
circumstances of Enron, even well-designed corporate governance structures
might not have led to discovery of the problems and successful intervention.3 1
Enron's demise might well have been a result of the "on the edge" atmosphere
prevalent at the firm. Large options packages in U.S. corporations entice
managers to manipulate the stock price. In Germany, lower executive pay and
fewer options give managers less of an incentive to manipulate." Finally, the
perceived goal of the German corporation is not profit alone. The head of a
major German company recently told Der Spiegel that German companies are
unlikely to accept "Anglo-Saxon cold capitalism, which exclusively focuses
on maximizing profits, [because it] will lead to a crisis in our system and to a
decline of acceptance for the pillars of the social free market economy."3"3
Should one system be replaced by another? Should Germany Americanize
its system of corporate governance, or vice versa?" 4 With regard to certain
3o See Chantayan, supra note 165; see also Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Cultural Hegemony: The
Exportation ofAnglo-Saxon Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany, 73 TUL L. REV. 69
(1998); see Chamy, supra note 5, at 145; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U.
L. REV. 641 (1999); Janis Sarra, Corporate Governance in Global Capital Markets, Canadian
and International Developments, 76 TUi. L. REV. 1691 (2002) (describing countervailing
pressure resisting the international convergence of corporate law in other countries situated in
their differing cultural, political, and economic structures and reflected in capital market and
corporate law regimes); Jacoby, supra note 290 (indicating that the German system would not
be sustainable absent social norms); Mark J. Roe, German "Populism" and the Large Public
Corporation, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 187, 190 (1994) ("[H]ow a nation regulates capital's
deployment will affect how large firms are organized.").
3" Wachtell etal., Memoranda on Corporate Governance AndAudit Conmittees Post-Enron,
in Disclosure & Other Lessons Learned After Enron: What You Need to Know Now to File Your
10-K & Other Forms, 1303 PLY/CORp 345 (2002).
312 Cheffins, supra note 180.
313 DER SPIEGEL, May 21, 1999, quoted in Dore et al., Varieties of Capitalism in the
Twentieth Century, 15 OXFORD, REV. ECON. POL'Y 102, 104-17 (1999).
314 Michael Adams, Bankenmacht undDeutscherJuristentag, 37-38 ZIP 1590, 1591 (1996)
(stating that Americans have examined the German bank-dominated systems in reviewing their
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features, change might be feasible, but rapid change of the entire system is
unlikely.1 5 Cultural relevance includes aspects of legal relevance and "it is"
worth realizing that the German and the U.S. systems of corporate governance
have different priorities. The hallmark of the U.S. system remains its
flexibility. Germany places its priorities elsewhere. "The [German] Stock
Corporation Act [AktG] is so strict and inflexible that many American lawyers
wonder how German companies mange to reasonably accomplish corporate
transactions under this statute. '316 The German system is set up to grant more
power to a wider variety of corporate constituencies. In practice, however,
banks dominate German corporations. Thus, Germany sacrifices flexibility in
corporate governance without reaping the potential benefits of a vocal diversity
of corporate constituencies that its two-tiered, labor-inclusive model set out to
achieve.
own corporate monitoring structures).
315 Brett H. McDonnell, Convergence in Corporate Governance-Possible, but not
Desirable, 47 VILL. L. REV. 341 (2002).
316 Schnorbus, supra note 293, at 582.
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